Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

Fan, Ruguo; Wang, Yibo; Lin, Jie

doi:10.3390/ijerph18168278

Cited by 40 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…In terms of the study of the relationship between emergency subjects, the academic community is trying to explain the internal and external factors that affect the relationship interaction and strategy selection between emergency response organizations from the perspectives of reciprocity, reward, punishment, and third parties [41][42][43]. However, most existing studies regard relevant government departments with the same political intention and emergency target as a unified whole.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Liu

Song

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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To reveal the interaction and influence mechanism between emergency rescue entities, and to explore and optimize a cooperation mechanism of emergency rescue entities, a tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency rescue cooperation based on government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions was constructed. The stability of each game subject’s strategy choice was explored. Simulation analysis was applied to investigate the influence mechanism of key parameters on the evolution of the game subject’s strategy combination. The research results show that government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions have consistent political demands and rescue targets in emergency rescue cooperation. The game subjects are driving forces for each other to choose positive strategies. The game evolution process of the emergency cooperation model shows a “mobilization-coordination” feature. At the same time, the emergency capital stock formed based on trust relationships, information matching, and institutional norms between game subjects can promote the evolution of the game system toward (1,1,1). In addition, for government organizations with limited emergency resources, the average allocation of emergency resources is not the optimal solution for emergency rescue efficiency. However, it is easier to achieve the overall target of emergency rescue cooperation by investing limited emergency resources in key variables that match the on-site situation. On this basis, combined with the practice of emergency rescues in emergencies, countermeasures and solutions are proposed to optimize the mechanism and improve the efficiency of emergency rescue cooperation.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Liu

Song

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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“…In accordance with the research of Mubarak and Zin, tourism and mass religious gatherings (MRG) may pose significant public health risks in the case of cross-border and intro-community transmission of infection [ 10 ]. Fan et al established the SEIR dynamic model of COVID-19 epidemic with a latent period based on complex network theory [ 11 ]. At the same time, according to the relevant data of COVID-19 epidemic in China and some regions, they simulated the model parameters for different scenarios and predicted the inflection point of COVID-19 epidemic in three situations by setting three different virus latent periods.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agricultural Openness and the Risk of COVID-19 Incidence: Evidence from China

Wang

Abula

Jizuo

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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At present, there are large number of articles on the impact of COVID-19, but there are only a few articles on the impact of COVID-19 and international agriculture. Agriculture product is different from other industrial products. If domestic food cannot be self-sufficient, it must be resolved through imports. This will inevitably face the dilemma between the opening up agriculture and the risk of importing COVID-19. This paper pioneered the use of entropy method, TOPSIS method and grey correlation analysis to predict the correlation between agricultural opening to the outside world and the input and spread of COVID-19. We use the correlation matrix quantifying the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases and agricultural openness to deduce that there is a significant positive correlation between the flow of agricultural products caused by China’s agricultural opening-up and the spread of COVID-19, and use the proposed matrix to predict the spread risk of COVID-19 in China. The results of the empirical analysis can provide strong evidence for decision-makers to balance the risk of COVID-19 transmission with the opening of agricultural markets, and they can take this evidence into full consideration to formulate reasonable policies. This has great implications both for preventing the spread of COVID-19 and for agricultural opening-up.

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“…Many scholars assume that in classical games of public health decision-making, especially in relation to early warning information management, participants do not always have symmetric information about an event and that most participants have bounded rationality [6][7][8][9]. erefore, evolutionary game theory is becoming an e ective tool for exploring public health early warning systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System

Cao

Zhang

2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Although the ability to manage public health emergencies in China has improved significantly, there are still many challenges to the existing information transmission mechanism in pandemic early warning systems. In this context, a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of the local government, the whistleblower, and the public is formulated. By using Matlab, the dynamic evolution path of the game model is stimulated under different conditions. Stable strategies for an early warning system for public health emergencies are also explored. The results indicate that the cost of whistleblowing, the cost of response, and the benefit of attention significantly influence strategic decisions among three parties. This study highlights the importance of whistleblowing in managing public health emergencies. Yet, our findings provide theoretical support for policy recommendations for promoting public health emergency preparedness.

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Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

Cited by 40 publications

References 29 publications

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Agricultural Openness and the Risk of COVID-19 Incidence: Evidence from China

The Whistleblower’s Dilemma: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Public Health Early Warning System

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