2016
DOI: 10.3201/eid2207.152032
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Surveillance for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus in Wild Birds during Outbreaks in Domestic Poultry, Minnesota, 2015

Abstract: In 2015, a major outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) infection devastated poultry facilities in Minnesota, USA. To understand the potential role of wild birds, we tested 3,139 waterfowl fecal samples and 104 sick and dead birds during March 9–June 4, 2015. HPAIV was isolated from a Cooper’s hawk but not from waterfowl fecal samples.

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Cited by 19 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…We also did not find evidence that input from wild birds played a role in the outbreak of the EA/NA H5N2 outbreak in Midwestern poultry. Instead, our analysis suggested that once the EA/NA H5N2 lineage entered the poultry production system in the Midwest USA, transmission was driven through poultry production‐related mechanisms because we found close phylogenetic distance among sequences from poultry facilities (Figure ), relatively infrequent estimate of cross‐species transmission (Table ), high estimated proportion of viral diversity that was sampled (Table ), and other surveillance data failed to detect this lineage in reservoir hosts (Grear et al., ; Ip et al., ; Jennelle et al., ; Krauss et al., ). We suggest that the lack of detection in wild birds points to facility biosecurity that was nearly sufficient to reduce the epidemic size, but had just enough failures to produce the observed consequences (50M birds depopulated and over US $3 billion; Greene, ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 67%
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“…We also did not find evidence that input from wild birds played a role in the outbreak of the EA/NA H5N2 outbreak in Midwestern poultry. Instead, our analysis suggested that once the EA/NA H5N2 lineage entered the poultry production system in the Midwest USA, transmission was driven through poultry production‐related mechanisms because we found close phylogenetic distance among sequences from poultry facilities (Figure ), relatively infrequent estimate of cross‐species transmission (Table ), high estimated proportion of viral diversity that was sampled (Table ), and other surveillance data failed to detect this lineage in reservoir hosts (Grear et al., ; Ip et al., ; Jennelle et al., ; Krauss et al., ). We suggest that the lack of detection in wild birds points to facility biosecurity that was nearly sufficient to reduce the epidemic size, but had just enough failures to produce the observed consequences (50M birds depopulated and over US $3 billion; Greene, ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 67%
“…However, we estimated that the poultry sequences sampled a high proportion of viral diversity in all segments (Table ). We cannot rule out that an unobserved reservoir of HPAIVs existed outside the sample associated with Midwest, but other surveillance in wild birds on and near infected poultry facilities detected no HPAIVs in wild birds contemporary to the poultry outbreak (Jennelle et al., ) and limited exposure in wildlife (Grear, Dusek, Walsh, & Hall, ; Shriner et al., ). A further observation from the phylogeny of the Midwestern poultry sequences suggested that transmission was not structured by production type, with egg‐laying chicken and domestic turkey facilities represented within the same viral lineages (Figures , ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…Our analysis demonstrates extensive interfarm transmission of virus subgroups 2a, 2b, and 2e but not of group 1 viruses, which could also infect wild birds, suggesting a change in the epidemiologic processes driving viral spread. Although a national level–structured surveillance effort was not initiated until July 2015 ( 19 ), H5N2 detections were far less frequent in the Midwest than in the Pacific flyway, suggesting few H5N2-infected wild waterfowl were in the Central and Mississippi flyways during the outbreak period ( 32 , 33 ). Nonetheless, detection of H5N2 viruses from wild birds in the Midwest in early 2015 and our phylogenetic analysis suggest that the HPAIV H5N2 moved from the Pacific flyway to the Mississippi and Central flyways as early as January or February 2015, with subsequent interfarm transmission in and between states of the Midwest.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Given the compact spatial arrangement of the events, relative incident timing ( Fig. 3) 70,71 , and the commonality of virus subtypes at each location (e.g., H7N3 in Jalisco, H5N2 in Upper Midwest), we conjecture that AIP clusters likely stemmed from some combination of mechanical (i.e., shared farm equipment, staff movement between farms, etc.) and environmental (i.e., common water, soil, and air) transmission 28,72 .…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%