From a phenomenological point of view psychology as a human science is a descriptive science. Psychology as a descriptive science and psychology as an explanatory science are two distinct types of science and should not be viewed as two phases of science. The major arguments of Amedeo Giorgi's theoretical justification of descriptive science are presented. His arguments are the grounds on which two leading questions are explicated: What is description and what is the role of description in qualitative research? In reflecting on the context of gathering, creating and analysing descriptions, a distinction between description, (concrete life-world descriptions) and description, (psychological description of a phenomenon) is made. Descriptions are placed in the context of the researcher's interest; the researcher's request for a description by a subject; the subject as a narrator; the meaning of a description as a text; the researcher as a reader of descriptions and the researcher as author of description-, The conclusion consists of what might be 'good' descriptions.Vanuit 'n fenomenologiese perspektief is die sielkunde as 'n menswetenskap 'n beskrywende wetenskap. Sielkunde as beskrywende wetenskap en sielkunde as verklarende wetenskap is twee duidelik onderskeibare wetenskappe en moet nie as twee fases van wetenskapsbeoefening beskou word nie. Die hoofkomponente van Amedeo Giorgi se teoretiese regverdiging van beskrywings word aangebied. Sy argumente dien as die grondslag waarop twee leidende vrae verder qeeksplisiteer word. Hierdie vrae is: Wat is 'n beskrywing en, wat is die rol van beskrywing in kwalitatiewe navorsing? Met betrekking tot die konteks waarin beskrywings bymekaar gemaak, geskep en ontleed word, word 'n onderskeid tussen beskrywinq, (konkrete leef-wsreld beskrywings) en beskrywinq, (psigologiese beskrywing van 'n fenomeen), getref. Beskrywings word binne die konteks van die navorser se belangstelling; die navorser se versoek vir 'n beskrywing deur 'n subjek; die subjek as verteller; die betekenis van 'n beskrywing as 'n teks; die navorser as leser van beskrywings en die navorser as outeur van beskrywinq-, geplaas. Die gevolgtrekking bestaan uit suggesties oor wat as 'n 'goeie' beskrywing kan kwalifiseer.
65From within a phenomenological attitude the question of psychology as a descriptive science received renewed attention. Giorgi's work (1986aGiorgi's work ( , 1986b is exemplary of the attempt to rectify mainstream psychology's view, and use, of description. He contends that epistemological criteria suitable for the context of verification are imposed on psychology and carried over into psychology. This state of affairs leads to an undifferentiated view that at best description is seen as a possible propaedeutic step, even a pre-scientific step, and that real science begins with explanation, hypothesis testing and verification. The descriptive perspective and the explanatory perspective are viewed as two phases of science rather than as two ways of doing science -two types of science, so distinct ...
