The mayor's advantage: Causal evidence on incumbency effects in German mayoral elections

Freier, Ronny

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.07.005

Cited by 37 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…Most importantly, Asatryan et al (2017) show that the introduction of direct democracy at the local level in Germany is associated with more public spending and document that local German voters do not seem to be fiscally conservative. Freier (2015) shows that mayors -comprising those of towns included in our sample -achieve a significant increase in the incumbency advantage when raising spending over and above the median level increase. At the same time, an upsurge in debt does not significantly alter the re-election chances.…”

Section: Theoretical Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 79%

Overlapping political budget cycles

et al. 2018

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We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive branch. Using municipal data, we identify cycles independently for the two branches, evaluate the effects of overlaps, and account for general year effects. We find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections. In the case of overlapping elections, we show that it is important whether the executive incumbent seeks re-election. To account for the potential endogeneity of that decision, we apply an IV approach based on age and pension eligibility rules.

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Section: Theoretical Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 79%

Overlapping political budget cycles

et al. 2018

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“…The incumbency advantage has empirically been confirmed in numerous papers (more recently by Freier, ), even though it does not apply to all circumstances (Ade, Freier, & Odendahl, ; da Fonseca, ). The advantage has often been linked to media coverage and applies even if the media are not (fully) controlled by the government.…”

Section: Empirical Relevance Of Assumptions and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Political budget cycles, incumbency advantage, and propaganda

Bohn

2018

Economics & Politics

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This paper combines incumbency advantage and political budget cycle theory. An opportunistic politician is given two instruments: deficit‐financed transfers and propaganda. Unlike earlier analytical models, but in accordance with the empirical literature, government manipulations do actually improve re‐election chances. However, the optimal level of government manipulation depends on country characteristics, in particular the competence dispersion among potential candidates. This may explain why it is easier to detect political budget cycles in, for instance, developing countries or new democracies. Results are robust to alternative competence distribution and propaganda cost assumptions.

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“…Then one of the candidates won and took office. In the current election, he is the incumbent and profits from substantial incumbency advantages, as shown in Freier (2015). Therefore, the race is not close and people abstain from voting.…”

Section: Descriptives and Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Freier () estimates that incumbency status increases the probability of winning the next election by 38–40 percentage points. …”

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confidence: 99%

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Turnout and Closeness: Evidence from 60 Years of Bavarian Mayoral Elections

Arnold

2018

Scandinavian J Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractOne prediction of the calculus of voting is that electoral closeness positively affects turnout via a higher probability of one vote being decisive. I test this theory with data on all mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria between 1946 and 2009. Importantly, I use constitutionally prescribed two-round elections to measure electoral closeness and thereby improve on existing work that mostly uses expost measures that are prone to endogeneity. The results suggest that electoral closeness matters: A one standard deviation increase in closeness increases turnout by 1.68 percentage points, which corresponds to 1 6 of a standard deviation in this variable. I also evaluate how other factors like electorate size or rain on election day affect turnout differentially depending on the closeness of the race.

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The mayor's advantage: Causal evidence on incumbency effects in German mayoral elections

Cited by 37 publications

References 50 publications

Overlapping political budget cycles

Overlapping political budget cycles

Political budget cycles, incumbency advantage, and propaganda

Turnout and Closeness: Evidence from 60 Years of Bavarian Mayoral Elections

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