The Politics of Property Taxation: Fiscal Infrastructure and Electoral Incentives in Brazil

Land and State Capacity During Civil Wars: How Land-Based Coalitions Undermine Property Taxation in Colombia

“…Lastly, and related to the previous point, this article sheds light on the role of key local land institutions for the state's extractive capacity (Christensen and Garfias 2020;Martinez 2020). In the case of Colombia, where land inequality is high, the erosion of land institutions has a long tradition: for instance, Sánchez-Talanquer (2020) shows how land registration increased in Conservative areas between 1930-50, while tax revenues lagged behind, due to the systematic undervaluation of property.…”

“…Outside contexts of civil conflicts, Hollenbach and Silva (2019) study the case of Brazil to show that economic elites can undermine the state's to collect revenues especially when levels of inequality are high. Related to this is the question of property rights institutions in the countryside (Christensen and Garfias 2020;D'Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017;Onoma 2009). Politicians, violent groups, and landowners alike, when exposed to the right window of opportunity, are willing to weaken and manipulate property rights in their attempt to accumulate wealth and land, one of the key tokens of power in the rural world.…”

“…When asked about taxation in Colombia’s countryside, an official at the National Land Agency (ANT) maintained: “The lack of clarity makes it impossible for local governments to obtain more resources and incentivizes large landowners to change this structure” (Personal Interview 7 2018). The positive consequences of cadasters for revenue generation are clear: as documented by recent empirical work, legibility about land—via strong and updated cadasters—increases municipal resources by 10 and 12% in Brazil and Colombia (Christensen and Garfias 2020; Martinez 2020).…”

“…Local taxation—the state’s capacity to extract resources from the population—is a cornerstone of modern states, implies gathering information about the population, and a bureaucratic body to collect taxes and punish non-payment. Moreover, changes in local property taxes typically depend on the willingness (Christensen and Garfias 2020) and ability of local politicians to observe property within their jurisdictions and enforce taxation. Unlike other taxes (e.g.…”

Using Registry Data to Assess Gender-Differentiated Land and Credit Market Effects of Urban Land Policy Reform: Evidence from Lesotho

“…Land reforms that, instead of giving secure rights and encourage investment, established rights that could be easily withdrawn and put political intermediaries in control of access to markets and services, 19 illustrate a willingness to tolerate significant economic losses for political gain. The extent to which land rights were formalized (Christensen and Garfias 2020), land was valued (Sánchez-Talanquer 2020), and the ability to provide social services (Fergusson et al 2020) have been affected by political considerations.…”