2019 IEEE International Workshop on Signal Processing Systems (SiPS) 2019
DOI: 10.1109/sips47522.2019.9020320
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Theoretical Analysis of Configurable RO PUFs and Strategies to Enhance Security

Abstract: Compared to traditional ring oscillator PUF (RO PUF), configurable RO PUF (CRO PUF) greatly increases the number of challenge response pairs (CRPs) and improves hardware utilization. However, in the conventional CRO PUF design, when a path is selected by the challenge to generate a response, the circuit characteristic information constituting the CRO PUF, such as the delay information of the configurable unit, the transmission model, and etc., can also be leaked. Once the adversary monitors and masters this in… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Strong PUFs normally have a significant number of CRPs, while weak PUFs have relatively small CRPs, e.g., only one in most cases. Strong PUFs, such as the arbiter PUF [13], the ring oscillator (RO) PUF [14] and the configurable RO (CRO) PUF [15], [16], use MUXs or inverters as configurable units. Weak PUFs, such as the static random access memory (SRAM) PUF [17] and the PicoPUF [18], utilize the mismatch of transistors or flip-flops to generate a 1-bit response.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Strong PUFs normally have a significant number of CRPs, while weak PUFs have relatively small CRPs, e.g., only one in most cases. Strong PUFs, such as the arbiter PUF [13], the ring oscillator (RO) PUF [14] and the configurable RO (CRO) PUF [15], [16], use MUXs or inverters as configurable units. Weak PUFs, such as the static random access memory (SRAM) PUF [17] and the PicoPUF [18], utilize the mismatch of transistors or flip-flops to generate a 1-bit response.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a lightweight hardware security primitive, the physical unclonable function (PUF) has been used for authentication and identification [2]. A PUF can extract the random manufacturing process variations of an integrated circuit (IC) as identifier [3]. In principle, any two chips cannot generate the same response with the same input.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The number of CRPs in a strong PUF increases exponentially, while the number of CRPs in a weak PUF is small, e.g., only one in most cases. Strong PUFs are normally utilized for device authentications [3], [4], and weak PUFs are commonly used for key generation [5], etc.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%