As War Ends 2019
DOI: 10.1017/9781108614856.010
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Transitional Justice in the Colombian Final Accord

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
3
1

Relationship

0
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 12 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Uribe’s strategy eventually pushed the FARC to the negotiating table, and under President Uribe’s former defense secretary and successor, President Juan Manuel Santos, the government brokered a peace agreement with the FARC over several years in Havana, Cuba. The 2016 peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC rebels is among lengthiest and most codified peace agreements ever engineered (Quinn and Joshi, 2019). However, shortly after the parties reached an agreement, the peace treaty was defeated in a public referendum on 2 October 2016 by a narrow margin.…”
Section: Background: the Conflicts In Colombiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Uribe’s strategy eventually pushed the FARC to the negotiating table, and under President Uribe’s former defense secretary and successor, President Juan Manuel Santos, the government brokered a peace agreement with the FARC over several years in Havana, Cuba. The 2016 peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC rebels is among lengthiest and most codified peace agreements ever engineered (Quinn and Joshi, 2019). However, shortly after the parties reached an agreement, the peace treaty was defeated in a public referendum on 2 October 2016 by a narrow margin.…”
Section: Background: the Conflicts In Colombiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I argue that after a period of relative stability and expectations informed by one of the most codified peace agreements ever drafted (Quinn and Joshi, 2019), the potential for a return to confrontation, or even unknown alternatives, can shift civilians’ dominant interpretation of the cost calculus between a continuation of the war and a negotiated peace. Considering the evidence indicating that external cues can influence (a) attitudes toward compromise and the termination of conflicts through negotiation and (b) safety-maximization is an important feature in conflict opinion formation (Fabbe et al, 2019; Tellez, 2019a), I anticipate that the unforeseen outcome of the peace referendum altered respondents’ conflict termination preferences.…”
Section: Peace Processes and Civilian Conflict Termination Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nonetheless, the current Peace Process with the FArC-EP suffers from slow implementation, especially regarding rural development and drug economy 58 . According to official data, only 16% of the objectives regarding land restitution have been achieved 59 .…”
Section: Ii) the Consequences Of The Internal Armed Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%