Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Approach for Low-Carbon Power Grid Technology Cooperation With Government Intervention

Abstract

Low-carbon technology innovation of power grid is vital for grid enterprises to improve their competitiveness and resource utilization efficiency. In this paper, a novel tripartite evolutionary game theory is proposed to examine the behavioral strategies of government, banks, and the grid enterprises in the low-carbon power grid technology innovation cooperation. The evolutionary replication dynamics equations are presented to study evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of participants. The meaningful simulation results are as follows: from the subsidy perspective, even if the government subsidies are phasing out, the ESS of the low-carbon grid technology cooperation still converges to the Pareto optimal equilibrium; from the cost perspective, the higher low-carbon technology innovation cost only slows down the evolution rate, while the higher business cost of carbon asset pledge credit and the lower incentive cost not only slow down the evolution rate but also change the evolution results. It shows that the business cost of carbon asset pledge credit has a greater impact on the evolution of the system than the incentive cost; from the benefit perspective, increasing the green revenue and the successful probability of the low-carbon technology innovation can both prompt the ESS to evolve to Pareto optimal state, and the effect of the former is greater than the latter. These results provide a theoretical guidance for government to promote the development of low-carbon technology innovation of power grid. INDEX TERMS Power grid enterprises, low-carbon technology innovation, tripartite evolution game, government intervention.

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