This research explores the determinants of vaccine hesitancy during the third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Hungary. This article utilizes data from in-person public opinion research conducted in Hungary (March 2021, N = 1000). Government supporters, older people (60 +) and COVID-19 survivors were more likely to accept vaccination, but these variables lose significance, once controlling for personal fears and pandemic-related attitudes. COVID-19 related fears and precautious behavior reduce, while general level of fears increase the probability of vaccine hesitancy. Fear from partner’s aggression and higher levels of financial security negatively correlate with vaccine hesitancy. Our study separately analyzes the effect of various pandemic-related conspiratorial beliefs on vaccine hesitancy. All analyzed false beliefs have a significant positive effect on vaccine hesitancy, but the strongest predictors are vaccine-related conspiracy theories (“microchip” and “population control” theories) and virus denial.

PM Viktor Orbán's government in Hungary is often seen as one of the paradigmatic cases of illiberalism and an intense contestation of immigration. This paper argues that the Hungarian government's strong focus on immigration and its hardline positions on the issue proved to be a political jackpot for the governing party. Besides presenting the claims and frames Fidesz has used regarding migration since 2015, three analytical aspects are covered in this article, based on Eurobarometer, European Social Survey and Hungarian domestic polling data. First, the trends in the perception of the importance of migration for the Hungarian voters are compared to the European public opinion. Second, the changes in the attitudes of Hungarians to immigration are also analysed in European comparison. Third, I also present what role the fears related to immigration played at the 2018 parliamentary elections. On the whole, the Hungarian centre-right successfully politicised the issue of migration, and acted as an agenda-setter rather than a follower. It was able to sustain a sense of crisis between 2015 and 2018; it exacerbated the rejection of immigration in society; and it was successful in entrenching migration as one of the top fears among its potential voters.

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This article helps to better understand the role orientations of the Central European Members of the European Parliament, the factors that influence their strategies, and the relationship between their roles and activities. Based on the results of a quantitative survey research with MEPs from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in the 2009-2014 term, I argue that it is possible to explain the political roles of MEPs by their attitudes towards politics and policy, and the territorial focus of representation (European vs. national level). Due to the internal mechanisms of the EP and its position in the multilevel governance system of European politics, these two dimensions represent dilemmas that all MEPs face, when it comes to the efficient use of their scarce resources: time and energy. This study demonstrates that socio-demographic factors, attitudes and political socialization all have an influence on what roles MEPs choose. The time spent in the EP, age, previous political experience, party affiliation, left-right self-definition and career ambitions are all important factors that can explain the political behavior of MEPs. The Central European MEPs' focus on politics vs. policy and the European vs. national political arena have different roots, and different variables explain them. Orientation towards politics and policy largely depends on previous political experience and future career ambitions. Focus on the European or the national level is best explained by age, party affiliation and left-right self-definition.