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Climate change has palpable cross-scale implications given the severity of the matter epitomized in the prolonged discussions and negotiations between various parties that incur the consequences of the policy applications. Cross-border adjustment, though seemingly plausible, is a controversial method employed to mitigate the adverse potential impact of carbon emissions through placing an extra cost for the goods imported from countries that lag behind the standards set by multiple global agreements. Exercising cross-border adjustment on international trading activities is likely to have positive reverberations on taming the perils posed by climate change as well as triggering unforeseen perturbations in the interaction of actors involved in the global trading system. This chapter intends to shed light on cross-border adjustments via diagnosing the issues emerging out of the inter-scale interactions and question its effectiveness in micro and macro terms.

This paper examines the employment intensity of economic growth in Southern Europe during the so-called “post-crisis” recovery years. A labor demand estimation model based on multidimensional panel data from 2010 to 2019 was utilized. Findings from our macroeconomic analysis of eight different industries refute the predictions of neoclassical labor theory in the region. The results further indicate the presence of jobless growth in the areas of overall employment, fulltime employment, and overall employees. They also signal that economic growth may have created job opportunities in part-time and youth employment, and among temporary employees, rather than full-time jobs. The paper links these findings to particular characteristics of the regional labor market, discusses their implications for understanding unemployment and formulates recommendations for future policy.

Starting from the premise that strategic interactions between countries influence trade policy decisions, this paper is a first attempt at exploring the possible outcomes of a trade dispute between Turkey and Russia, assuming that Turkey can lodge a complaint about Russia's protectionist move to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Employing the course of events during the recent economic conflict between the two countries, the article models the stages of a trade game wherein players exhibit non-cooperative behaviour. It finds that Turkey reporting Russia to the DSB depends on the cost of the dispute, which represents both economic losses and losses that can be considered disadvantages in a broader sense. The results show that in trade relations where asymmetric interdependence is observed, if both parties mutually commit to an international organisation, binding regulations may provide strategy options that are otherwise infeasible for the disadvantaged player.

International trade introduces a range of risks, which causes uncertainty over the timing of delivery and payment between exporters and importers. This chapter is a first attempt in dissecting Turkey's trade data in terms of risk allocation and trust between the parties involved. Breaking down Turkish export and import data for the years 2000 to 2018 according to methods of payment and use of currencies, the chapter first finds the risk is distributed unevenly between the exporter and the importer. Then findings are evaluated to open a new avenue of future research, constructed on the inquiry whether emerging economies like Turkey can establish trust in their trade with developed economies by using blockchain technology.