Bosnia-Herzegovina and southern-coastal/hinterland-region of Dalmatia, Republic of Croatia are a part of the same seismo-tectonic province and share a considerable and real threat of high-magnitude earthquakes. Numerous Magnitude 6 (Richter) and above earthquakes have been recorded in the past 500 years and some of them have resulted in a considerable loss of life, material and even prestige or geopolitical significance (e.g. the demise of Ragusa in the earthquake of 1667). Given the propensity of the region for destructive earthquakes, complex geomorphological framework and challenging infrastructure, still recovering in parts from the Yugoslav civil wars of the 1990s., the region may yield a “perfect” crisis in the aftermath of a major earthquake event. Taking into consideration unchecked development of several metropolitan areas, lack of oversight and permitting, decaying infrastructure as well as unresolved political ambiguities and territorial disputes, a potential destructive earthquake may create several cascading crises, especially if it coincides with some other challenging events (e.g. winter storms). This study is taking into consideration several scenarios, their possible effects and resulting conditions upon which cascading crises may arise in the aftermath of a magnitude 7+ earthquake affecting several major urban areas in southern and central Bosnia-Herzegovina and the southern Dalmatian region of Croatia. These scenarios are intended to provide training aids and risk assessments in countering the destructive forces after the earthquake, expected to test the current crisis-management models.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republic of Croatia share 931km of border (494km land and 425km riverine), which has been contentious for the greater part of the modern European history and represented one of the hardest and most-militarized border demarcating the frontiers of the major empires. Nowadays, it is in the process of becoming another hard-border between the Schengen-Zone EU and non-EU Western Balkans. In this study we are considering several strategic elements required for planning of effective and constructive border security, while countering variety of pseudo-hybrid warfare operations as well as tactical considerations when responding to crisis, communications and overall control of the fluid frontier. Strategic elements taken into consideration are:  a) overall contiguity of the border, b) communications network / trafficability at border-crossing and c) geospatial support in the intelligence preparation of the area. Tactical elements considered are a) real-time geospatial support during operations b) alternative communications and vetting of alternative communications c) defensive operations (e.g. drone defense, jamming defense, incursion prevention). We are considering lessons-learned from the hostilities and frozen-conflicts in Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Yemen and potential future conflagrations in Trans-Dnistria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo* and the Baltics. We are using several criteria in understanding the required geospatial preparations required to undertake or defend against mass-migrations and potential hybrid threats such as unresolved territorial issues, population density information, infrastructure condition, land-use and overall completeness and availability of geospatial data. * Designation without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence

Na prvi pogled škole i vrtići su bezbedna mesta budući da u njima nema štetnih i opasnih materija, tehnološki opasnih procesa, a radni procesi su manje-više uhodani, predvidljivi i rutinski. Međutim, kao mesta na kojima se praktično svakodnevno okuplja i boravi veći broj ljudi, obrazovno-vaspitne ustanove su podložne različitim vrstama kriza. Činjenica da najveći deo populacije ovih ustanova čine deca i mladi čini ih dodatno ranjivim i osetljivim na krizne događaje. Upravo ova ranjivost populacije, u kombinaciji sa njenom simboličkom vrednošću i značajem, vidljivošću i lakom dostupnošću, te relativno slabim sistemom odbrane koji od njih stvara "meku metu", čini obrazovno-vaspitne ustanove skoro idealnim ciljem za različite vrste zlonamernih ljudskih akcija. Osim toga, krizne situacije u obrazovno-vaspitnim ustanovama su pod posebnom lupom i interesovanjem masovnih medija, tako da upravo medijska amplifikacija može od pojedinačnog ekscesa ili incidenta napraviti ozbiljnu kriznu situaciju. U ovom kontekstu krizno planiranje u obrazovno vaspitnim ustanovama ima poseban značaj. Pored opštih prinicpa kriznog planiranja mora se prilikom izrade kriznih planova voditi računa i o specifičnostima obrazovno vaspitnih institucija.

In Croatia, the mission, set of goals and general issues of crisis management are still not completely, and to a sufficient extent, defined by appropriate legal solutions, regulations and strategic documents. Therefore, access to this vital area of safety issues is still divided to certain areas depending on the type of crisis or threat. The necessity of establishing a comprehensive and unified system to manage crises was recognized over fifteen years ago, and a series of discussions has been held on the issue, as well as the issue of developing the concept of a crisis management system. Despite these efforts, there have been no significant results. The issue was approached in 2004. by passing the Law on Protection and Rescue and the establishment of the State Protection and Rescue Administration (DUZS), and again in 2005. by passing a new Civil Protection Law. However, the civil protection system covers only a part of an integrated crisis management system at the national level, such as protection and rescue, disaster and major accident management. The normative framework of the Republic of Croatia, even after Croatia entered the EU and adopted it's acquis communautaire, is marked by the lack of comprehensive solutions regarding the definition of national crises and the establishment of a crisis management system.