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Clinical neuroimaging has largely been limited to examining the neurophysiological outcomes of treatments for psychiatric conditions rather than the neurocognitive mechanisms by which these outcomes are brought about as a function of clinical strategies, and the cognitive neuroscientific research aiming to investigate these mechanisms in nonclinical and clinical populations has been ecologically challenged by the extent to which tasks represent and generalize to intervention strategies. However, recent technological and methodological advancements to neuroimaging techniques such as functional near-infrared spectroscopy and functional near-infrared spectroscopy-based hyperscanning provide novel opportunities to investigate the mechanisms of change in more naturalistic and interactive settings, representing a unique prospect for improving our understanding of the intra- and interbrain systems supporting the recogitation of dysfunctional cognitive operations.

Neuroimaging and neuropsychological methods have contributed much toward an understanding of the information processing systems of the human brain in the last few decades, but to what extent do cognitive neuroscientific findings represent and generalize to the inter- and intra-brain dynamics engaged in adapting to naturalistic situations? If it is not marked, and experimental designs lack ecological validity, then this stands to potentially impact the practical applications of a paradigm. In no other domain is this more important to acknowledge than in human clinical neuroimaging research, wherein reduced ecological validity could mean a loss in clinical utility. One way to improve the generalizability and representativeness of findings is to adopt a more “real-world” approach to the development and selection of experimental designs and neuroimaging techniques to investigate the clinically-relevant phenomena of interest. For example, some relatively recent developments to neuroimaging techniques such as functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) make it possible to create experimental designs using naturalistic tasks that would otherwise not be possible within the confines of a conventional laboratory. Mental health, cognitive interventions, and the present challenges to investigating the brain during treatment are discussed, as well as how the ecological use of fNIRS might be helpful in bridging the explanatory gaps to understanding the cultivation of mental health.

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Helping clients gain insight into the ways in which their thinking influences the expression of emotional distress and maladaptive behavior is an important goal of CBT-based psychotherapies. However, efforts to establish this insight into the connection between dysfunctional beliefs and the consequences of having them (i.e., B-C connection) are often met with resistance. To address this issue in practice, therapists can draw upon certain existential principles underpinning CBT theory. More specifically, practitioners can use the concepts of existential freedom and responsibility, contained in the rational-humanistic view of rational-emotive behavior therapy, to complement current disputation strategies in the object to establish the B-C connection and, importantly, to facilitate cognitive change. Employing in practice what is postulated in theory in such cases is apt to provide individuals with a larger context of human agency in which to consider cognitive mediation.