While terrorism and violence tend to move in parallel, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has brought this to new heights in its quest to attain an Islamic State in southern Philippines. Though small compared to other Islamist organizations, namely the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, its violent acts—kidnapping, beheading of hostages, among others—have more than made up for its size. In fact, it has been the most brutal terrorist movement in the Philippines. Partly due to this and the allegiance of its leadership to the equally brutal transnational terrorist group, Islamic State, its leader Isnilon Hapilon was designated as the Amir of Southeast Asia. The group was responsible for the Marawi Siege, which ran for five months from May to October 2017, and is considered the worst terrorist‐linked bloodbath in the country. The deaths of pro‐Islamic State leaders such as Hapilon are unlikely to change this key DNA of the ASG and of terrorism in the Philippines in the near future.

Utilizing social media profiles, court documents and media reports, this article analyzes the Malaysian foreign fighter networks in Iraq and Syria between 2012-2019. It is found that the Malaysian foreign fighter phenomenon is primarily driven by charismatic personalities, i.e. influential figures who were able to attract individuals into the Middle East. The attempted movement of fighters into Iraq and Syria can be divided into three phases corresponding to three personalities; the first led by Al-Qaeda linked Yazid Sufaat, the second by Ajnad al-Sham linked Lotfi Ariffin and the third by Islamic State (IS) linked Muhammad Wanndy Mohd Jedi. Contrary to popular belief, the first wave of Malaysian militants had joined Syrian based rebel groups like Ajnad al-Sham instead of IS with the shift occurring after Lotfi Ariffin's death in September 2014. The three phases also highlight the shift in recruitment strategy from physical recruitment to the purely online sphere. A radicalization driver model of Malaysian fighters is proposed and it is argued that the two main factors that drove Malaysian fighters into the conflict zones are i) External factors: charismatic personalities; romanticization of jihad; moral factors and ideological factors; and ii) Internal factors: discontent with the government.

No abstract

This policy brief discusses the threat of maritime terrorism in the Tri-border area and the weaknesses of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement, a trilateral treaty between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines that was set up to mitigate terrorism in the region. We also highlight the challenges associated with counter-terrorism in the region such as resource allocation considerations due to the national sovereignty-counter-terrorism dilemma and provide key policy recommendations aimed at policymakers and practitioners in the area.

No abstract