This article compares and contrasts the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons programs of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State through the framework of organizational structure, typology, ideology and CBRN incidents (selected case studies). A three-step CBRN model explaining the use of CBRN weapons by both groups is proposed. This model suggests that the use of CBRN weapons is predicated on three factors: leadership at the strategic level; acquisition of material at the operational level and technical capabilities at the tactical level. It is found that the failure of both groups in developing and carrying out large-scale CBRN attacks boils down primarily to the lack of technical capabilities and the difficulties associated with acquisition of materials. It is argued that the future CBRN threat landscape will likely be dominated by the threat of small-scale, localized attacks using crude chemical or biological agents by lone actors or autonomous cells as opposed to larger-scale centrally directed attacks.

Utilizing social media profiles, court documents and media reports, this article analyzes the Malaysian foreign fighter networks in Iraq and Syria between 2012-2019. It is found that the Malaysian foreign fighter phenomenon is primarily driven by charismatic personalities, i.e. influential figures who were able to attract individuals into the Middle East. The attempted movement of fighters into Iraq and Syria can be divided into three phases corresponding to three personalities; the first led by Al-Qaeda linked Yazid Sufaat, the second by Ajnad al-Sham linked Lotfi Ariffin and the third by Islamic State (IS) linked Muhammad Wanndy Mohd Jedi. Contrary to popular belief, the first wave of Malaysian militants had joined Syrian based rebel groups like Ajnad al-Sham instead of IS with the shift occurring after Lotfi Ariffin's death in September 2014. The three phases also highlight the shift in recruitment strategy from physical recruitment to the purely online sphere. A radicalization driver model of Malaysian fighters is proposed and it is argued that the two main factors that drove Malaysian fighters into the conflict zones are i) External factors: charismatic personalities; romanticization of jihad; moral factors and ideological factors; and ii) Internal factors: discontent with the government.

This article investigates the use of family networks in suicide terrorism using the 2018 Surabaya suicide attacks as a case study. The Surabaya attacks were the first case in the region that involved entire family networks including parents and their young children. The main aim of the article is to provide an understanding of the use of family networks in suicide terrorism particularly that of women and children and explore the implications that it has for the region. It is argued that there are numerous advantages of using women and children in suicide terrorism which will continue to be exploited by terrorist groups. A simplified model of motivating factors for suicide attackers is proposed and it is found that the three main motivating factors are ideology, socio-cultural factors and personal crises. The Surabaya case shows that individuals may be motivated to carry out suicide attacks primarily by a misconstrued religious ideology rather than motivations that are nationalistic in nature. The Surabaya case is not an isolated case and the use of family networks is likely to be a growing trend in future suicide attacks.

This policy brief discusses the threat of maritime terrorism in the Tri-border area and the weaknesses of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement, a trilateral treaty between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines that was set up to mitigate terrorism in the region. We also highlight the challenges associated with counter-terrorism in the region such as resource allocation considerations due to the national sovereignty-counter-terrorism dilemma and provide key policy recommendations aimed at policymakers and practitioners in the area.