Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is a new approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities in which nuclear safeguards provisions and features are designed into the facility from the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical protection, and other barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities, while integrating with safety and other project considerations. Because the successful implementation of SBD is primarily a project management and coordination challenge, this report focuses on that aspect.To improve the implementation of nuclear safeguards worldwide, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) commissioned a U.S. DOE National Laboratory project team to study how SBD could be implemented. This is in support of the NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). The long term objective is to promote the global implementation of SBD so that new nuclear facilities will be designed with nuclear safeguards, safety, and physical protection features incorporated into the facility. This will make new nuclear facilities safer, more secure, and more easily safeguarded. In addressing these issues early in the design stage, it will also be more cost effective, by avoiding the costly retrofits to accommodate these requirements after the facility starts up.In 2008, the SBD project team developed a high-level framework for institutionalizing SBD. As a result, the establishment of SBD as a global standard was found to depend on three pillars: 1) Requirements Definition, including the definition of requirements and criteria for successful safeguards performance, 2) Design Processes, including project management and coordination, and 3) Design Toolkit, including the technology and methodology used in the design and assessment of performance against requirements. These in turn were seen as resting on the foundation of Institutionalization, including education, outreach, training, and standardization. Each of these areas is vital to successfully establish SBD as a global standard.The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses on the design and construction process -specifically, project management and coordination. This includes project planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling, communication and interaction between the domestic and international safeguards authorities, facility builders, owner/operators, and other stakeholders during the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It further specifies the stages in an ideal nuclear facility design and construction project and identifies: 1) When safeguards design activities take place, 2) When safeguards stakeholders should be involved, 3) The interaction between safeguards requirements, analysis, and decision making relevant to plant design, and 4) The documents for recording this process, analysis, and de...

Executive SummaryThe safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a "State-Level approach." The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and costefficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a(Bjornard, et al. , 2009b IAEA, 1998;Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) methodology introduced here supports SBD in three areas:1. It supports effective operator/designer engagement in the necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner/designer of a new or modified facility at the stages where the designer's SBD efforts can be applied most productively.2. It presents a screening tool intended to help the designer identify potential safeguard issues for a) design changes to existing facilities, b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with established IAEA safeguards approaches, and c) new designs.3. It provides a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools such as SBD good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods (called here the FSA toolkit). This toolkit can be used by the owner/designer to both identify potential safeguards issues and to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA.The majority of new facilities are expected to reflect modest design evolution from existing safeguarded facilities. Therefore, a major focus of the FSA process is efficiently assessing the impact of such an evolution in facility or process design upon required safeguards-related design features. The more a design evolves or differs from the design of similar-type facilities, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues will be introduced, and the more challenging SBD becomes. FSA can help the designer anticipate where new safeguards challenges are posed, and the size of the gap between established safeguards approaches and safeguards tools and measures at existing facilities of the same type and what the IAEA might require for the new design. For first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, comparison with previously required safeguard design features may not be sufficient. Accordingly, a comprehensive vulnerability or path assessment may be required to adequately identify and assess new safeg...

Executive SummaryThe safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a "State-Level approach." The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and costefficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a(Bjornard, et al. , 2009b IAEA, 1998;Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) methodology introduced here supports SBD in three areas:1. It supports effective operator/designer engagement in the necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner/designer of a new or modified facility at the stages where the designer's SBD efforts can be applied most productively.2. It presents a screening tool intended to help the designer identify potential safeguard issues for a) design changes to existing facilities, b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with established IAEA safeguards approaches, and c) new designs.3. It provides a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools such as SBD good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods (called here the FSA toolkit). This toolkit can be used by the owner/designer to both identify potential safeguards issues and to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA.The majority of new facilities are expected to reflect modest design evolution from existing safeguarded facilities. Therefore, a major focus of the FSA process is efficiently assessing the impact of such an evolution in facility or process design upon required safeguards-related design features. The more a design evolves or differs from the design of similar-type facilities, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues will be introduced, and the more challenging SBD becomes. FSA can help the designer anticipate where new safeguards challenges are posed, and the size of the gap between established safeguards approaches and safeguards tools and measures at existing facilities of the same type and what the IAEA might require for the new design. For first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, comparison with previously required safeguard design features may not be sufficient. Accordingly, a comprehensive vulnerability or path assessment may be required to adequately identify and assess new safeg...

Executive SummaryThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked with verifying that commitments made by States as part of their safeguards agreements with the IAEA are fulfilled. The IAEA verifies declarations made by States and detects undeclared activities in States through the implementation of a Safeguards Approach (SA) for the facility and a State Level Approach (SLA) for the entire state. At the facility level, the SA consists of measures to verify the special fissionable material present and its movement as declared by the facility. The SA measures also provide assurance that the facility operations are as declared and that the facility is not being misused. All these safeguards measures at the facility level contribute to the SLA for the entire state."Safeguards by Design" (SBD) is the practice of incorporating features to support application of these measures into facility designs throughout the entire facility lifecycle. The ultimate goal of SBD is to increase the safeguardability of a facility, a qualitative measure of "the degree of ease with which a nuclear energy system can be effectively and efficiently placed under international safeguards" (GIF 2006). Over the last 20 years, a growing volume of SBD literature has focused on safeguards principles and best practices. However, these informational and analytical tools have been independently developed with little effort made to form a consistent, structured methodology for a facility designer and the facility's safeguards experts to use in assessing the safeguardability of their design.To address this need, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Brookhaven National Laboratory, and several consultants to develop the Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) process (Bari et al. 2012). FSA is a screening process used by a facility designer to focus their attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical applicability of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant design. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness rather than evaluating the safeguardability of the NuScale design. The report describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents considerations for functional "infrastructure" guidelines to ensure safeguardability.The application of FSA to the NuScale design consisted of four activities:1. The authors compared the NuScale design to the design of a current large pressurized water reactor using the FSA screening tool (Bari et al. 2012). The comparison proved useful in identifying those aspects of the design that posed safeguards chall...

Cover photograph of uranium gas centrifuge enrichment plant (Schanfein, 2008). The design of modern uranium gas centrifuge enrichment plants will benefit from application of the Safeguards-by-Design process. DISCLAIMERThis information was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. Government. Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness, of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trade mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. INL/EXT-14777Revision 1Institutionalizing Safeguards-by-Design: High-level Framework EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce proliferation risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. To this end a multilaboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The result could ultimately help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating international safeguards into facility design. This effort is a component of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and is jointly sponsored by the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) and the Office of Nuclear Energy. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08.Safeguards-by-Design means different things to different people. In this effort SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and potentially other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered along with safety and other factors when weighing facility design alternatives.The Institutionalizing Safeguards-by-Design (ISBD) team examined facility design processes, best practices and lessons learned from previous facility projects, developments in nuclear safety, and project and systems engineering, in order to identify the essential elements of SBD and a framework for its implementation. Historically, safeguards issues have been deferred until late in the design and construction process, resulting in added costs, and schedule and operational...