For many firms, using their supply chains as competitive weapons has become a central element of the strategic management process in recent years. Drawing on the resource‐based view and theory from the organizational learning and information‐processing literatures, this study uses a sample of 201 firms to examine the influence of a culture of competitiveness and knowledge development on supply chain performance in varied market turbulence conditions. We found that synergies exist between a culture of competitiveness and knowledge development: their interaction has a positive association with performance. In addition, based on behavioral and contingency theories, we found that market turbulence moderates these relationships, having a positive influence on the knowledge development–performance link and a negative influence on the culture of competitiveness–performance link. Managers who are confident about the level of market turbulence they will face can use this sense to decide whether to emphasize developing either a culture of competitiveness or knowledge development in their supply chains. For those firms whose managers are unlikely to be able to predict the degree of turbulence they will face over time, a focus on both a culture of competitiveness and knowledge development is critical to ensuring success. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

We examine the influence of CEO equity-based compensation on strategic risk taking by the firm. Building off the Behavioral Agency Model, Agency Theory, and Prospect Theory, we develop arguments about when equity-based compensation elements will increase or decrease executive risk propensity and, in turn, strategic risk taking. Incorporating a behavioral perspective into our models of incentive alignment provides us with new and potentially more accurate predictions about how individual elements of CEO pay will influence risk selection, as well as how equity compensation interacts with cash compensation and with other factors to influence risk preferences. In general, this study provides evidence that CEO equity-based compensation significantly influences strategic risk, but that this influence is more nuanced and complex than conventional treatments of executive compensation assume. In particular, we find that different forms of equity-based pay exhibit dissimilar influences on strategic risk and that their influence changes as their value and vesting status change. Second, we find that cash-based forms of pay moderate the incentive properties of equity-based pay, indicating that cash-based pay may affect how executives perceive risks associated with equity pay. Finally, we find that stock price volatility and board actions each also moderate the incentive effects of equity-based pay. In sum, our results argue for increased recognition of a behavioral perspective on executive compensation and greater precision in how we measure and model the incentive alignment properties of CEO compensation.

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Research on the role of the corporate office in firm performance has focused on establishing how much performance variance can be attributed to a "corporate effect," with little attention devoted to understanding how this influence occurs. In this study, we model capital allocation competency as a dynamic managerial capability and find that lower levels of allocation competency in the form of excess investment to business units with relatively poorer future prospects reduce business unit performance. We also find that market conditions affect performance implications of capital allocation-allocation competency is more salient in more competitive markets. These results enhance our understanding of how the corporate office influences business unit performance through its role in allocating capital across business units.