A particular aspect of path dependence and change is discussed here. To understand institutional change in transition economies, a game theoretic model that combines economic changes with changes in the social values system is proposed, in a mechanism where the two changes are interdependent and influence one another in a repeated game. The speed of change in this dynamic model is the result of two rates, the ‘‘learning rate’’, how fast agents are learning to play the new ‘‘capitalist’’ game and the so-called ‘‘going-over rate’’, the mix in every time period of economic agents playing according to the ‘‘old’’ communist values and those playing according to the ‘‘new’’ capitalist values.

The main objective is to discuss the historical-evolutionary character of the latest work of Douglass North. His views have been lately criticized, especially as far as their historical insight is concerned, as well as the nature of the concepts and the ideas he used. Three interconnected arguments dealing with North's neoclassical roots, his individualistic point of departure and his inclination to universalistic explanations sustain this allegation, and they will be presented in the first part. In the second part, a response to these arguments is suggested. Finally, the evolutionary character of his later work is discussed and established in the last part. It is held that by introducing ‘culture’ into the heart of the analysis of institutional change, North is oriented toward context dependent and consequently historically specific explanations.

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Weber recognized explicitly that his concept of ideal-type is directly borrowed from economic theory and as it is commonly admitted from the German-speaking 'marginalist school'. Nevertheless, the construction of ideal-types reminds greatly the definition of economic rationality made by John Stuart Mill, who also built up a concept to explain, in individualistic terms, the real world in a given historical and geographical context. The position defended here is that Weber generalizes Mill's methodological proposition of concept formation regarding economic rationality to accomplish his much larger project of determining the social factors responsible for the rationalization of the Western civilization.Max Weber John Stuart Mill Ideal-TYPES Economic Rationality Economic Methodology,

This paper reviews the way that social norms and ethical values in general, and trustworthiness in particular, is perceived to affect the behavior of economic agents in view of the work of Adam Smith, Nassau William Senior and John Stuart Mill. Classical Political economists held that economic actions are context-dependent and thus constantly under the influence of social norms and values. It is further suggested here that Classical Economists had established that trustworthiness acts as a general ethical precondition for the efficient behaviour of the markets and an important asset of the national social capital.