Harvest control rules have become an important tool in modern fisheries management, and are increasingly adopted to provide continuity in management practices, to deal with uncertainty and ecosystem considerations, and to relieve management decisions from short-term political pressure. We provide the conceptual and institutional background for harvest control rules, a discussion of the structure of fisheries management, and brief introductions to harvest control rules in a selection of present day cases. The cases demonstrate that harvest control rules take different forms in different settings, yet cover only a subset of the full policy space. We conclude with views on harvest control rules in future fisheries management, both in terms of ideal and realistic developments. One major challenge for future fisheries management is closing the gap between ideas and practice.

We formulate the maintenance scheduling decision as a dynamic optimization problem, subject to an accelerating decay. This approach offers a formal, yet intuitive, weighting of the trade-offs involved when deciding a maintenance schedule. The optimal maintenance schedule reflects the trade-off between the interest rate and the rate at which the decay accelerates. The prior reflects the alternative cost, since the money spent on maintenance could be saved and earn interests, while the latter reflects the cost of postponing maintenance. Importantly, it turns out that it is sub-optimal to have a cyclical maintenance schedule where the building is allowed to decay and then be intensively maintained before decaying again. Rather, local governments should focus the maintenance either early in the building's life span and eventually let it decay towards replacement/abandonment or first let it decay to a target level and then keep it there until replacement/abandonment. Which of the two is optimal depends on the trade-off between the alternative cost and the cost of postponing maintenance.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate a survey on critical success factor for the maintenance of local public buildings and how reported score values and factor rankings depend on characteristics (contingencies) of the local governments that participated. Design/methodology/approach The authors use data from a large-scale survey of Norwegian local governments that covered 66 per cent of all local governments and 80 per cent of the population. The authors combine these data with contingent information from public registers on demographics, fiscal, political and geographical characteristics. The authors run regressions to determine whether contingencies affect survey results. They further study how score values vary with a key contingent factor. Findings The main result of this paper is that the reported importance of critical success factors is contingent on local government population levels. A comparison of importance rankings based on population quartiles shows that ranking orders change, both between quartiles and from the overall ranking, and that certain factors show systematic changes. Further, the authors find that when controlling for sampling error, groups of factors should be considered as equally important. This result holds both for the full sample ranking and for rankings within population quartiles. Originality/value The results of this paper have implications for all survey-based investigations of critical success factors where contingent information on respondents are available. Contingencies need to be taken into consideration, both when assessing rankings according to some criteria and when comparing actual score values.

In light of evidence of low levels of maintenance of public buildings, we investigate trends and determinants of public building conditions in Norwegian local governments. On average, the condition of Norwegian local public facilities have improved slightly in the period 2004-2016. Survey data suggest substantial fluctuations in building conditions and a negative relationship between building conditions in 2004 and 2016. A driver behind this result is high investments in local governments with poor building conditions in 2004. Further, we find no systematic relationship between the conditions in 2004 and maintenance expenditures in subsequent years. We conclude that if maintenance levels are too low, investment levels may be too high. Generally, our results hint at an unhealthy balance between maintenance spending and public spending. Finally, we find that both political and fiscal factors are important in explaining building conditions.

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