No abstract

This paper contributes to the recent explosion of literature on the epistemological role of emotions and other affective states by defending two claims. First, affective states might do more than position us to receive evidence or function as evidence. Affective states might be thought to appraise evidence, in the sense that affective states influence what doxastic state is rational for someone given a body of evidence. The second claim is that affective evidentialism, the view that affective states function rationally in this way, is not just possible but plausible and fruitful. We offer two arguments in favor of affective evidentialism.

We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment, according to which one knows that p only if one's epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, has a problematic consequence: one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we defend that it has the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the consequence we find problematic is not, in fact, problematic.We argue that a certain version of pragmatic encroachment has a problematic consequence. We first describe this version of pragmatic encroachment, and then we articulate the problematic consequence. Finally, we deal with a worry that the problematic consequence is not, in fact, problematic. To preview: The version of pragmatic encroachment in view says that one knows that p only if one's epistemic position with respect to p is practically adequate, and the problematic consequence is one can lose knowledge that p by getting evidence for p, and conversely, one can gain knowledge that p by getting evidence against p. 1 1 By 'evidence for', we mean confirming evidence; by 'evidence against', we mean disconfirming evidence. 123Philos Stud

No abstract

No abstract