No abstract

This paper quantifies the effects of shocks in political relations on merchandise goods exports to China for the’Quad’ countries, namely Australia, India, Japan and the USA, between 1998 and 2018. Using a vector auto‐regression approach, our estimates suggest that deteriorating political relations only have short‐ and long‐run effects on India's aggregate export growth to China over this period; for Australia, Japan and the USA, there are none. A time‐disaggregated analysis of 5‐year sub‐periods shows that long‐term effects (lasting for up to 2 years) are significant for India and Japan for the sub‐period 1998–2002, while in all other sub‐periods there are no significant effects for any of the four countries. A product‐disaggregated analysis of the top five exports for each of the Quad countries to China reveals that, while the effects of political relations on trade do vary by product type and country in the short term, there are no long‐run effects of deteriorating political relations on any of these countries’ major exports to China.

In this paper we examine the empirical relationship between economic openness and nationalism. We replicate and extend the crosscountry analysis of Lan and Li (2015) using additional measures of nationalism and additional years of data from the World Values Survey. We fail to find the negative relationship between economic openness and nationalism that Lan and Li (2015) find, even when using the same data sources, years and sample of countries. When we expand the sample of countries and years of the data, we find no statistically significant relationship between economic openness and nationalism.

Using cross‐country data, we find little evidence that economic openness has an impact on the level of nationalism in countries. We use three waves of the World Values Survey from 1999 through 2014 combined with data on economic openness from the Penn World Tables. Across all three waves, we find no statistically significant relationship between economic openness and nationalism. However, there is evidence for a negative association between economic openness and nationalism from 2001 to 2007 and a positive association between 2007 and 2014. This corresponds to the rising nationalistic and anti‐trade sentiment evident throughout the world despite the general trend of increasing economic openness.