Abstract. Engineering-Procurement-Construction (EPC) method has increasingly been applied in international markets. In this research, the causes of contractors' claims in international EPC projects are modeled and empirically tested with industry survey, structural equation modeling and case studies from the perspective of Chinese contractors. The established model outlines the causes of contractors' claims as: external risk (sociopolitical risks, economic risks, and natural hazards), clients' organizational behavior (untimely payment, change orders, and inefficient processing), and project definition in contract (unclear scope of works, and unclear technical specification). The structural equation modelling validates that these causes have direct influences on claim respectively. Besides, clients' organizational behavior acts as a partial mediation between external risk and claim, demonstrating that external risk can also exert influence on claim through affecting clients' organizational behavior. Seven case studies further confirmed and interpreted the substantive meaning of these relationships. This study establishes interdisciplinary linkages among knowledge areas of contracting, risk management, organizational behavior, and international EPC project delivery, which has important primary contributions in both theory and practice. Understanding how the fundamental factors interactively lead to claims can help contracting parties to develop effective claim strategies, proactively mitigate project risks, and ultimately improve EPC project performance.

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Previous studies agree that cooperation among participants is critical to successfully deliver projects; however, little research has quantitatively illustrated how participants benefit from cooperation. Based on partnering and cooperative game theories, the Degree of Willingness to Cooperate (DWC) model has been used in this study to reflect the interactions among participants through dynamic simulation. With the support of data collected from a field survey, the outcomes of DWC model simulation have been tested, confirming that degrees of willingness to cooperate (DWCs) have significantly positive influences on cooperation gains, and incentives are effective in improving participants' rewards. Application of the DWC model then reveals the cooperation status of hydropower developments in Southwest China, suggesting five practical strategies for inter-organizational cooperation in project delivery. This study advances the knowledge area of multi-organizational dynamics during project delivery by building interdisciplinary linkage between partnering theory and cooperative game theory, which provides a structure to quantitatively unfold the cause-effect relationships between DWCs, incentives, and participants' rewards. This research also reveals the mutual goals and different priorities of project participants, and answers questions on how coalitions can be formed and how cooperation gains should be equitably allocated. The above

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