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This article endeavours to analyse the existing effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes (MECRs). The states like India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are not party to these regimes but had managed to attain their nuclear weapons capabilities by exploiting the weak links of MECRs. Conceptually, this sets the stage for an interesting debate to overcome some of the loopholes in MECRs, and to demonstrate that effective and realistic cooperation can go a long way in yielding constructive outcomes. To fill the cracks in the MECRs, it is essential to consider the non-NPT nuclear weapon states' issue with a view to construct reliable and effective MECRs. The MTCR membership criteria, Indo-US nuclear deal and India-specific waiver by the NSG states have raised some pertinent and challenging questions concerning the credibility and effectiveness of NPT and other MECRs. The paper argues that India and Pakistan both should be accorded an equal chance to join the MECRs - as both are declared de jure NWS. Their independent status is distinct from the NPT's January 1, 1967, cut-off date principle to qualify for a de jure NWS position, ipso facto is not applicable on them.