Collaborating Multidisciplinary Decision Making Using Game Theory and Design Capability Indices

Xiao, Angran; Zeng, Saixing; Allen, Janet K.; Mistree, Farrokh; Rosen, David W.

doi:10.2514/6.2002-5617

Cited by 12 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Each of these instantiations is aimed at reducing iteration (emanating from changes in stakeholder objectives) by making constituent decisions robust to changes in parameters outside of their control. A similar effect is achieved by Xiao and co-authors, who aspire to ensure a crisp transition from design to manufacture via digital interfaces [22,36]. The mechanism for eliminating wasteful iteration is the adoption of game theoretic protocols (e.g., Cooperative, Non-Cooperative, and Stackelberg Leader/Follower) in conjunction with Design Capability Indices [37,38].…”

Section: A Critical Review Of Game Theoretic Protocols As Used For Comentioning

confidence: 79%

“…However, communication alone is not sufficient for supporting interactions. The issue of effectively modeling the exchanges required for the resolution of strongly coupled problems throughout a product's design process has been addressed using a number of different mechanisms ranging from software frameworks (see, e.g., [5][6][7]) to the application of multi-disciplinary optimization approaches (see e.g., [8][9][10][11][12][13][14]), negotiations (see, e.g., [15][16][17]), and more fundamental game theoretic principles (see e.g., [18][19][20][21][22]), as focused upon in this paper. Applications of game theory in engineering design can be distinguished according to the underlying information flows they are meant to structure, as well as the degree of cooperation that defines stakeholder interactions.…”

Section: Interactions and Conflict Resolution In Engineering Design Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In essence, interactions can thus only be supported once the coupled design sub-problems have been formulated and can be solved to derive the BRCs, required for capturing stakeholder strategies. Once these have been captured mathematically, coupled design problems can be solved either (1) concurrently via BRC intersection and the establishment of a Nash Equilibrium (see, e.g., [19,20,32]), (2) iteratively via explicit BRC exchange and consideration in design sub-problem solution, where improved solutions are possible via robust design techniques (see, e.g., [33][34][35]), or (3) via complete transfer of responsibility for making required system level tradeoffs and BRCs, alongside ranged sets of specifications, to a single stakeholder (see, e.g., [22,36]). In the first case achievement of a Nash Solution is dependent on whether the strategies converge, as investigated in Refs.…”

Section: A Critical Review Of Game Theoretic Protocols As Used For Comentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Clearly, this is only possible once all coupled sub-problems have been modeled in their entirety and appropriate strategies for tradeoff resolution can be formulated. Similarly, using Stackelberg games to model the transition from design to manufacture [22,36] requires transfer of completely formalized decision and analysis models in conjunction with stakeholder strategies.…”

Section: Application Of Stackelbergmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Preliminary efforts in this direction require individual stakeholders to relinquish or transfer control over their respective domains of expertise in order to achieve a solution to coupled design problems. This can be facilitated via (1) the communication of ranged sets of design solutions (to be refined by downstream decision-makers) [22,36] or (2) by desensitizing design sub-problems to coupled parameters [35]. Other examples include the creation of a clean digital interface between design and manufacture in Refs.…”

Section: Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Concise Interactions and Effective Management of Shared Design Spaces: Moving Beyond Strategic Collaboration Towards Co-Design

́ndez

Panchal

Allen

et al. 2005

Volume 5a: 17th International Conference on Design Theory and Methodology

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Often, design problems are coupled and their concurrent resolution by interacting stakeholders is required. The ensuing interactions are characterized predominantly by degree of interdependence and level of cooperation. Since tradeoffs, made within and among sub-systems, inherently contribute to system level performance, bridging the associated gaps is crucial. With this in mind, effective collaboration, centered on continued communication, concise coordination, and non-biased achievement of system level objectives, is becoming increasingly important. Thus far, research in distributed and decentralized decision-making has focused primarily on conflict resolution. Game theoretic protocols and negotiation tactics have been used extensively as a means of making the required tradeoffs, often in a manner that emphasizes the maximization of stakeholder (personal) payoff over system level performance. More importantly, virtually all of the currently instantiated mechanisms are based upon the a priori assumption of the existence of solutions that are acceptable to all interacting parties. No explicit consideration has been given thus far to ensuring the convergence of stakeholder design activities leading up to the coupled decision and the associated determination of values for uncoupled and coupled design parameters. Consequently, unnecessary and costly iteration is likely to result from mismatched objectives. In this paper, we advocate moving beyond strategic collaboration towards co-design. We present an alternative coordination mechanism, centered on sharing key pieces of information throughout the process of determining a solution to a coupled system. Specifically, we focus on (1) establishing and assessing collaborative design spaces, (2) identifying and exploring regions of acceptable performance, and (3) preserving stakeholder dominion over design sub-system resolution throughout the duration of a given design process. The fundamental goal is to establish a consistent framework for goal-oriented collaboration that (1) more accurately represents the mechanics underlying product development and (2) facilitates interacting stakeholders in achieving their respective objectives in light of system level priorities. This is accomplished via improved utilization of shared resources and avoidance of unnecessary reductions in design freedom. Comparative performance of the proposed method is established using a simple example, involving the resolution of a tradeoff with respect to a system of non-linear equations.

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Section: A Critical Review Of Game Theoretic Protocols As Used For Comentioning

confidence: 79%

Section: Interactions and Conflict Resolution In Engineering Design Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Critical Review Of Game Theoretic Protocols As Used For Comentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Application Of Stackelbergmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Concise Interactions and Effective Management of Shared Design Spaces: Moving Beyond Strategic Collaboration Towards Co-Design

́ndez

Panchal

Allen

et al. 2005

Volume 5a: 17th International Conference on Design Theory and Methodology

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Platform Valuation for Product Family Design

Moon

Simpson

2013

Advances in Product Family and Product Platform Design

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A Market-Based Design Strategy for a Universal Product Family

Moon

McAdams

2012

Journal of Mechanical Design

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Companies that generate a variety of products and services are creating, and increasing research on, mass-customized products in order to satisfy customers’ specific needs. Currently, the majority of effort is focused on consumers who are without disabilities. The research presented here is motivated by the need to provide a basis of product design methods for users with some disability—often called universal design (UD). Product family design is a way to achieve cost-effective mass customization by allowing highly differentiated products serving distinct market segments to be developed from a common platform. By extending concepts from product family design and mass customization to universal design, we propose a method for developing and evaluating a universal product family within uncertain market environments. We will model design strategies for a universal product family as a market economy where product family platform configurations are generated through market segments based on a product platform and customers’ preferences. A coalitional game is employed to evaluate which design strategies provide more benefit when included in the platform based on the marginal profit contribution of each strategy. To demonstrate an implementation of the proposed method, we use a case study involving a family of light-duty trucks.

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Collaborating Multidisciplinary Decision Making Using Game Theory and Design Capability Indices

Cited by 12 publications

References 10 publications

Concise Interactions and Effective Management of Shared Design Spaces: Moving Beyond Strategic Collaboration Towards Co-Design

Concise Interactions and Effective Management of Shared Design Spaces: Moving Beyond Strategic Collaboration Towards Co-Design

Platform Valuation for Product Family Design

A Market-Based Design Strategy for a Universal Product Family

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