Competitive Authoritarianism

Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan A.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353

Cited by 2,506 publications

(109 citation statements)

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“…We define "armed actors" broadly as nongovernmental entities using extra-legal violence to achieve political aims related to the state or its governance. 18 We include some elections outside of purely free-and-fair contests, but domestic actors must expect that party participation in electoral politics can plausibly change policy directly.…”

Section: Scope Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Armed Groups Participate in Elections

Matanock

Staniland

2017

SSRN Journal

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Armed actors are often involved in electoral politics, from the fusing of ballots and bullets in armed political parties to insurgents covertly backing politicians. This article develops new concepts and theory to better understand these complex relationships between violent actors and democratic practice. It first offers a novel conceptualization of armed groups' electoral strategies that systematically maps out variation in the organizational directness and public openness of groups' involvement in elections. The article then uses comparative case studies to develop theory about the conditions under which each of these electoral strategies is most likely, and what can trigger changes between them. The interaction of armed groups' power and expectations of popular support with governments' policies of toleration or repression determines the strategies of electoral participation that groups pursue. These concepts and arguments lay the foundation for a systematic research agenda on when and how "normal" and armed politics become intertwined.Word Count: 13,042 2

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Section: Scope Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Armed Groups Participate in Elections

Matanock

Staniland

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…El primer concepto, siguiendo una definición procedimental estándar (Levitsky y Way 2010), se caracteriza por contar con elecciones libres y limpias, sufragio inclusivo, amplia protección de derechos políticos y libertades civiles, así como que los candidatos elegidos gobiernan efectivamente sin poderes no elegidos bajo la sombra (Mainwaring y Pérez-Liñan 2005). En cambio, un autoritarismo competitivo es un tipo de régimen híbrido, que comparte únicamente las instituciones formales de la competencia electoral multipartidista de la democracia, pero que se diferencia de esta en que el gobernante de turno comete abusos de poder que vulneran los derechos políticos y las libertades civiles, al tiempo que sesga el campo de juego a su favor, generando que la capacidad de la oposición para competir sea seriamente comprometida (Levitsky y Way 2010).…”

Section: Crisis De Estatalidad Y Régimen Políticounclassified

“…Los latinoamericanos también han visto emerger regímenes políticos híbridos que combinan características de la democracia y del autoritarismo, como los llamados autoritarismos competitivos (Levitsky y Way 2010). Por lo tanto, una pregunta de gran actualidad en la región es por qué en algunos casos la democracia se mantiene y en otros se cae, dando paso a un autoritarismo competitivo.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

“…Por lo tanto, este trabajo de investigación no se centra en el ámbito descriptivo-conceptual en el que se ha enfocado principalmente los estudios sobre regímenes híbridos. 2 En cambio, indaga sobre las causas y los mecanismos del surgimiento de los autoritarismos competitivos complementando lo trabajado por Levitsky y Way (2010) 3 y en la línea de lo trabajado por Levitsky y Loxton (2012), pero evaluando sus argumentos. El objetivo es lidiar -parafraseando a O'Donnell (1994)-no con la forma final sino con el "animal político" en crecimiento.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

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Los escudos de la democracia en Argentina y Perú: la crisis como ruta hacia el autoritarismo competitivo

Encinas

2016

Rev. cienc. polít. (Santiago)

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RESUMENEn un contexto en que los golpes de Estado y los gobiernos militares prácticamen-te han desaparecido del escenario político en América Latina, el presente artículo busca explicar por qué en dos casos políticamente similares y que experimentaron severas crisis de estatalidad, surgieron resultados divergente en el régimen político: estabilidad democrática en Argentina y autoritarismo competitivo en Perú. La evidencia permite plantear que se debe a la presencia o ausencia de dos factores profundos y de largo plazo que actúan como contrapesos a la acumulación de poder de los presidentes: la dinámica intrapartidaria y la robustez de la política subnacional. Finalmente, el artículo concluye planteando la importancia académica y normativa de indagar el peso de estos factores en otros casos.Palabras clave: democracia, autoritarismo competitivo, crisis, partidos políticos, política subnacional ABSTRACT In a context in which coups d'etat and military rule have practically disappeared from Latin America, why did severe political crises under similar political conditions produce democratic stability in Argentina but competitive authoritarianism in Peru? This article presents evidence that the intra-party dynamics and the robustness of sub-national politics determine regime outcomes by limiting the long-term accumulation of presidential power. The article concludes by highlighting the importance of both factors for studying other cases.Key words: democracy, competitive authoritarianism, crisis, political parties, subnational politics * Este artículo está basado en mi Tesis de Licenciatura presentada en la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (2013), asesorada por Eduardo Dargent. Estoy especialmente agradecido con él y con Alberto Vergara por sus sugerencias, así como por el apoyo y el aliento brindados. Asimismo, agradezco a Jorge Aragón, Damarys Canache, Marylia Cruz, Kent Eaton, Manuel Figueroa, Yamilé Guibert, Steve Levitsky, Ángel Ragas, Paolo Sosa, Martín Tanaka, Aaron Watanabe y Mauricio Zavaleta por los valiosos comentarios a versiones previas del manuscrito. Sus consejos y los de dos estupendos revisores anónimos fueron muy importantes para mejorar el artículo. Sin embargo, los errores y las omisiones son de mi entera responsabilidad.

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“…27 Russia ended the first decade of the twenty-first century with a "stable competitive authoritarian regime" according to Levitsky and Way; I concur, but argue that path-dependency theory can help provide another dimension of explanation as to why Russia's low linkage and low leverage combined with its increased organizational power to give rise to such a regime.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

Russian Autocracy Redux: Path Dependency and the Late Modern State

Warhola¹

2012

cbp

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Path dependency emerged as a theoretical approach in the social sciences (specifically economics) in the 1980s, and has gradually been applied with greater frequency in political science. As a form of historical institutionalism, it shows promise of casting significant light on processes of political stability and change. The present study examines several large-scale defining traits of Russian politics and governance from the perspective of historical path dependence: to date, most applications of path-dependency theory to Russian studies have focused more on economics than politics and governance per se. This essay applies core ideas in path dependency theory to the case of Russia in the early twenty-first century, focusing on significant political traits that emerged during the Putin and Medvedev presidencies. This study proceeds from the view that politics revolves fundamentally around three core axes: identity, interests, and institutions; every aspect of political life, arguably, falls under one or more of these dimensions and all show path-dependent tendencies. The traits of Russian governance that show evidence of pathdependent self-replication include: (1) tendencies toward monocratic manifestations of political power; (2) political authority being conceived and exercised in neo-autocratic modes that deliberately control, marginalize, or patently exclude broad and efficacious participatory democracy; (3) an apparently instinctive trend toward political centralization; and (4) a tendency to vacillate historically between a weak and strong state, with powerful historical impulses toward the latter. By applying core ideas in pathdependency theory to the case of Russian politics in the early twenty-first century, our understanding is deepened.

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Competitive Authoritarianism

Cited by 2,506 publications

References 0 publications

How and Why Armed Groups Participate in Elections

How and Why Armed Groups Participate in Elections

Los escudos de la democracia en Argentina y Perú: la crisis como ruta hacia el autoritarismo competitivo

Russian Autocracy Redux: Path Dependency and the Late Modern State

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