2008
DOI: 10.1016/j.jlp.2007.06.010
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Success criteria time windows of operator actions using RELAP5/MOD3.3 within human reliability analysis

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Cited by 27 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Regulatory applications of probabilistic safety assessment include monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of rules and requirements, training of the regulatory body staff, risk follow-up, risk-based safety indicators, analysis of operational events, assessment of deviations, response to emergency conditions, ranking of safety issues, ranking of importance of plant equipment, risk-informed inspection, safety guidance and prioritisation of regulatory research. Utility applications of probabilistic safety assessment include: -optimizations of technical specifications, including surveillance requirements optimization, changes and exemptions to technical specifications (Yang et al, 2000;Čepin & Martorell, 2002), -support for modification of licensing basis and assessment of plant changes, -management of in-service inspection and testing, optimization of maintenance, which includes preventive and corrective maintenance (Martorell et al, 2000;Čepin, 2002), -configuration control and planning of maintenance at outages, prioritization of activities and scheduling of the activities (Harunuzzaman & Aldemir, 1996), -improving training for operators and operational support stuff (Čepin, 2007a; Čepin, 2008), -improving of plant procedures (Prošek & Čepin, 2008), -improving plant vulnerability and security questions (Čepin et al, 2006; Čepin, 2009). In addition, probabilistic safety assessment is used for the design of new plants and it represents a chapter of the final safety report.…”
Section: Analyses Results and Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regulatory applications of probabilistic safety assessment include monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of rules and requirements, training of the regulatory body staff, risk follow-up, risk-based safety indicators, analysis of operational events, assessment of deviations, response to emergency conditions, ranking of safety issues, ranking of importance of plant equipment, risk-informed inspection, safety guidance and prioritisation of regulatory research. Utility applications of probabilistic safety assessment include: -optimizations of technical specifications, including surveillance requirements optimization, changes and exemptions to technical specifications (Yang et al, 2000;Čepin & Martorell, 2002), -support for modification of licensing basis and assessment of plant changes, -management of in-service inspection and testing, optimization of maintenance, which includes preventive and corrective maintenance (Martorell et al, 2000;Čepin, 2002), -configuration control and planning of maintenance at outages, prioritization of activities and scheduling of the activities (Harunuzzaman & Aldemir, 1996), -improving training for operators and operational support stuff (Čepin, 2007a; Čepin, 2008), -improving of plant procedures (Prošek & Čepin, 2008), -improving plant vulnerability and security questions (Čepin et al, 2006; Čepin, 2009). In addition, probabilistic safety assessment is used for the design of new plants and it represents a chapter of the final safety report.…”
Section: Analyses Results and Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is why it is excepted that passive safety systems combine among others the advantages of simplicity, reduction of human interaction (Prosek and Cepin, 2008), reduction or avoidance of external electrical power or signals, reduction or avoidance of hard of failures (Mathews et al, 2008).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Passive systems (IAEA, 1991) are expected to contribute significantly to the safety of future nuclear power plants by combining their peculiar characteristics of simplicity, reduction of human interaction (Prosek and Cepin, 2008) and reduction or avoidance of hardware failures (Mathews et al, 2008). On the other hand, the uncertainties associated to their actual operation and modelling are usually larger than in active systems.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%