The joint criminal enterprise doctrine appears more and more as the 'magic weapon' in the prosecution of international crimes. Yet, the doctrine not only gives rise to conceptual confusion and conflicts with some fundamental principles of (international) criminal law but also invades the traditional ambit of command responsibility liability. This becomes obvious if both doctrines are applied simultaneously in cases against accused with some kind of superior position. After a short introduction on both doctrines, as interpreted in modern case law, the article gives some examples of their simultaneous application and tries to develop distinguishing criteria in light of the case law and a 'dogmatic' analysis of both the doctrines. A reference to the theory of 'Organisationsherrschaft' shows that there is yet another option to impute international crimes to top perpetrators.

El presente artículo plantea la discusión en torno a la necesidad de una convención especializada para la investigación, juzgamiento y castigo de los crímenes de lesa humanidad (crimes against humanity). A ese fin y como punto de referencia, se aborda la normativa contenida el artículo 7 del Estatuto de la Corte Penal International. Con ello se intenta, como propósito central, someter esta disposición a un riguroso análisis crítico y comparar sus rendimientos frente a la definición del delito propuesta en el Proyecto de Convención Internacional para la Prevención y la Sanción de los Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad, elaborado por un grupo internacional de expertos, en el que participó el autor de este artículo. Un segundo tema a tratar, cercano al propuesto, es la capacidad efectiva que tiene o debería tener la CPI para prevenir y perseguir los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Este problema afecta a uno de los pilares fundamentales del Derecho Penal (internacional): su posible efecto de disuasión.

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Genocide is a crime with a double mental element, i.e. a general intent as to the underlying acts, and an ulterior intent with regard to the ultimate aim of the destruction of the group. The prevailing view in the case-law interprets the respective 'intent to destroy' requirement as a special or specific intent (dolus specialis) stressing its volitional or purpose-based tendency. While this view has been followed for a long time in legal doctrine without further ado, it has recently been challenged by knowledge-and structure-based approaches, which have not received sufficient attention. A historical, literal, systematic and teleological interpretation of the 'intent to destroy' requirement, taking into account the particular structure of the genocide offence and the meaning of 'intent' in comparative law, reveals that the traditional view can no longer be maintained. It should be replaced by a combined structure-and knowledge-based approach that distinguishes according to the status and role of the (low-, mid-and top-level) perpetrators. Thus, the purpose-based intent should be upheld only with regard to the top-and mid-level perpetrators, whereas for the lowlevel perpetrators knowledge of the genocidal context should suffice. Lastly, this new Volume

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